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Abstract
Given the decision to implement a non-welfaristic redistribution scheme,
we analyze which mechanisms are favored by traditional Lorenz domi-
nance and poverty dominance adherents. We show that for large classes
of income functions Lorenz dominance results can be found in the compar-
ison of two egalitarian equivalent mechanisms. Comparisons of diﬀerent
conditionally egalitarian mechanisms only yield poverty dominance re-
sults. Finally, certain egalitarian equivalent mechanisms can Lorenz dom-
inate all conditionally egalitarian mechanisms. Our analysis stresses the
need for accurate empirical estimates of the pre-tax income function and
of the distributions of responsibility and compensation characteristics.
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1 Introduction
Supported by numerous empirical applications (e.g. Kakwani (1984)), the tra-
ditional analysis of redistribution mechanisms has concentrated on the study of
income distributions using concepts such as Lorenz dominance (following funda-
mental contributions of Atkinson (1970) and Shorrocks (1983)), the with Lorenz
dominance related issue of progressivity (starting with Jakobsson (1976), Fell-
man (1976) and Kakwani (1977)) and poverty (following pioneering work by
Sen (1976)).
Recently, non-welfaristic income redistribution schemes are presented (Fleur-
baey (1994, 1995), Bossert (1995), Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996)). These ax-
iomatically founded mechanisms are designed to fulfil to diﬀerent degrees the
fairness goal of compensating individuals for factors beyond their responsibility.
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In that, they follow ideas of political philosophers like Dworkin (1981a, 1981b),
Arneson (1989) and Cohen (1989), who motivate egalitarians to criticize tradi-
tional welfaristic theory, where the objective of the government is to maximize
a social welfare function based on the aggregation of individual utilities only,
for ignoring the issue of personal responsibility. Following Cohen, diﬀerent out-
comes should only be equalized when they are due to factors beyond control
of the individual. Conversely, diﬀerences due to diﬀerential eﬀort are morally
acceptable. These opinions have smoothed the path for non-welfaristic theory,
where one has to collect non-utility information such as expended eﬀort to ex-
press a social judgement. However, these equal opportunity-considerations have
given rise to the compensation problem (extensively surveyed in Fleurbaey and
Maniquet (2003)). Within the context of first best income redistribution and
without separability assumptions on the pre-tax income function, no solution
can at the same time assure equal incomes to individuals with equal responsibil-
ity characteristics, while guaranteeing equal transfers to individuals with equal
compensation characteristics. The redistribution mechanisms of Bossert and
Fleurbaey (1996), namely the egalitarian equivalent mechanism and the con-
ditionally egalitarian mechanism, following Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) and
Fleurbaey (1995), are derived from relaxing either one of these axioms.
Today, non-welfaristic theory still has a hard time convincing traditional an-
alysts and hence takes up a relatively small share of normative public economics.
However, both empirical work (e.g. Schokkaert (1999)) and real life examples
show that these non-welfaristic concepts are interesting from a policy viewpoint,
since in most western democracies people seem sensitive to the basis on which
redistribution is performed. The unpopularity could be due to the fact that
most of the theory is predominantly first best (for second best versions of the
egalitarian equivalent and the conditionally egalitarian solutions, see Bossert et
al. (1999)) or because the implications of the implementation of non-welfaristic
redistribution schemes in terms of the traditional concepts are not yet clear.
Our paper aims at contributing to that latter need. Revolving around the
comparison of income distributions, we start from the viewpoint of a social
planner, primarily concerned about the size of mean income and how unequally
incomes are distributed around this mean. However, instead of comparing real
world income distributions, we study the income distributions resulting from
the implementation of the egalitarian equivalent mechanism and the condition-
ally egalitarian mechanism. Clearly, the priorities of our social planner conflict
those of her non-welfaristic opponent: while the former favors the non-welfaristic
redistribution mechanism that implements the most equal income distribution,
the latter considers income diﬀerences after non-welfaristic redistribution, repre-
senting the reward of showing higher responsibility, perfectly justifiable. In that
sense, our analysis could be interpreted as a traditional look into non-welfaristic
income redistribution: given the decision to implement a non-welfaristic redistri-
bution scheme, we analyze which mechanisms are favored by traditional Lorenz
dominance and poverty dominance adherents. However, since a comparison of
diﬀerent non-welfaristic redistribution schemes essentially amounts to a com-
parison of diﬀerent reward patterns to responsibility (see Fleurbaey (1996) for
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a related discussion), we believe that also non-welfarists can benefit from this
analysis.
This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we introduce the pre-tax in-
come function, discuss the goal of non-welfaristic redistribution, present the
egalitarian equivalent mechanism and the conditionally egalitarian mechanism
and suggest the criterion of Lorenz dominance to compare diﬀerent income dis-
tributions. In section 3 we impose some minimal assumptions on the pre-tax
income function in order to keep the analysis as general as possible. Without
making distributional assumptions on individual’s responsibility and compensa-
tion parameters, we compare the income distributions of two diﬀerent egalitarian
equivalent mechanisms, two diﬀerent conditionally egalitarian mechanisms and
an egalitarian equivalent mechanism versus a conditionally egalitarian mecha-
nism. We check whether under one of the two mechanisms both the poorest do
not get poorer while the richest do not get richer. After taking this necessary
condition for Lorenz dominance into consideration, only the comparison of an
egalitarian equivalent mechanism with a conditionally egalitarian mechanism re-
mains undecided. Additional information is needed, so in section 4 we present a
specific example, which illustrates the results derived in the previous section but
at the same time allows us to draw more precise conclusions: possible poverty
dominance between two conditionally egalitarian mechanisms is examined and
also the comparison of an egalitarian equivalent mechanism with a conditionally
egalitarian mechanism is revisited. Section 5 concludes by pointing out which
non-welfaristic redistribution mechanisms are attractive for traditional analysts.
2 Non-welfaristic redistribution schemes
The model presented here is taken from Bossert (1995). Suppose that in a popu-
lation N = {1, ..., n}, n ≥ 2, person i’s (i ∈ N) individual characteristics vector
ai can be partitioned into two vectors: a
R
i ∈ ΩR, representing the individual’s
responsibility characteristics, and aSi ∈ ΩS , representing her compensation char-
acteristics. The set of all possible characteristics vectors is Ω = ΩR×ΩS , where
ΩR ⊆ Rr, ΩS ⊆ Rs and ΩR, ΩS 6= ∅. The characteristics profile is given by
A = (a1, ...,an) ∈ Ωn. Denote f : Ω → R++ : a = (aR,aS) → f(a) an income
function mapping, assigning pre-tax income to each possible characteristics vec-
tor and let F be the set of all possible pre-tax income functions. An economy
is described by e = (A,f). A redistribution mechanism F : (Ωn,F)→ Rn : e→
[F1(A), ..., Fn(A)] maps an economy into an income distribution.
The goal of non-welfaristic income redistribution is to preserve the eﬀect
of responsibility characteristics and to eliminate the influence of compensation
characteristics. Revelatory work of Fleurbaey (1994, 1995) and Bossert (1995)
elucidates the compensation problem: unless the income function is additively
separable in aR and aS , no redistribution mechanism can only but fully compen-
sate for diﬀerentials in aS . Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) relax some of the ax-
ioms underlying this impossibility result to derive the two solutions at the heart
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of our research, the egalitarian equivalent mechanism FEE and the conditionally
egalitarian mechanism FCE . These mechanisms are designed to fully accom-
plish one of the two goals (respectively compensation and responsibility), while
the other goal is only fulfilled for a so called ’reference’ vector. FEE and FCE are
first best redistribution schemes, i.e. redistribution is supposed to be possible
without loss of total income:
Pn
i=1 f(ai) =
Pn
i=1 F
EE
i (A) =
Pn
i=1 F
CE
i (A).
Our purpose is to evaluate these redistribution mechanisms, using the tra-
ditional concept of Lorenz dominance. The following subsections explain FEE,
FCE and the concept of Lorenz dominance in more detail.
2.1 The egalitarian equivalent mechanism
FEE gives an individual k the following income:
Y EEk = f(a
R
k , a˜
S)− 1
n
nX
i=1
¡
f(aRi , a˜
S)− f(aRi ,aSi )
¢
(1)
where a˜S ∈ ΩS is the reference compensation characteristics vector.
With this mechanism, every agent has a post-tax income equal to the pre-
tax income she would earn if her compensation characteristics were a˜S , plus
a uniform transfer. Two egalitarian equivalent mechanisms only diﬀer in the
choice of a˜S . This choice determines the reward scheme for responsibility, i.e.
it determines the magnitude of income diﬀerences due to diﬀerences in aR.
FEE satisfies the strong compensation axiom of ’group solidarity in aS ’:
any variation in some agent’s compensation characteristics is equally borne by
all agents. At the same time, FEE only satisfies the mild responsibility axiom
of ’equal transfer for reference a˜S ’. This implies that there is no reason to
perform any redistribution only when everybody’s compensation characteristics
are equal to the reference vector.
2.2 The conditionally egalitarian mechanism
FCE gives an individual k the following income:
Y CEk = f(a
R
k ,a
S
k )− f(a˜R,aSk ) +
1
n
nX
i=1
f(a˜R,aSi ) (2)
where a˜R ⊆ ΩR is the reference responsibility characteristics vector.
With this mechanism, every agent has a post-tax income equal to the average
pre-tax income that would prevail if everyone in society has aR = a˜R. If the
agent deviates from this reference level, she alone bears the resulting diﬀerence.
Two conditionally egalitarian mechanisms only diﬀer in the choice of a˜R. This
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choice determines the magnitude of diﬀerences in transfers due to diﬀerences in
aS .
FCE only satisfies the mild compensation axiom of ’equal income for a˜R’:
income equality is only required if all agents have responsibility characteristics
equal to some reference value. FCE also satisfies the strong responsibility axiom
of ’individual monotonicity in aR’. This means that a change in one agent’s
responsibility characteristics only aﬀects this person’s post-tax income.
2.3 Lorenz dominance
Since total income does not change after the implementation of an egalitar-
ian equivalent mechanism or a conditionally egalitarian mechanism, our social
planner favors the non-welfaristic redistribution mechanism that implements the
most equal income distribution. Therefore, the criterion of Lorenz dominance
suggests itself for the analysis. An income distribution A Lorenz dominates an
income distribution B when the bottom 100p per cent of income units in A
have a greater share of total income than in B and this holds true for every
p between 0 and 1. In other words, Lorenz dominance amounts to second or-
der stochastic dominance of the cumulative income distribution function of A,
GA(x), over the cumulative income distribution function of B, GB(x). Formally,
S(Y ) =
R Y
Ymin
(GB(x)−GA(x))dx ≥ 0, for all Y ∈ [Ymin, Ymax]. A necessary con-
dition for Lorenz dominance requires that, at the same time, the poorest are not
poorer and the richest are not richer under distribution A compared to distribu-
tion B. When results in terms of Lorenz dominance cannot be drawn, attention
goes to the poorest. The criterion of poverty dominance, which searches Lorenz
dominance over all incomes below some poverty line Z, may tell which distri-
bution has less poverty. Formally, S(Y ) ≥ 0, for all Y ∈ [Ymin, Z].
3 Distributional analysis: general framework
In this section, we state Lorenz dominance results with respect to the diﬀerent
non-welfaristic redistribution schemes in general terms. First, we impose some
properties on and define two large classes of pre-tax income functions which we
use to define domains for redistribution mechanisms. Successively, we compare
the income distributions of two egalitarian equivalent mechanisms with diﬀerent
reference compensation parameters, the income distributions of two condition-
ally egalitarian mechanisms with diﬀerent reference responsibility parameters
and the income distributions of an egalitarian equivalent mechanism and a con-
ditionally egalitarian mechanism. We search for dominance results that hold for
all economies in the domains defined. This implies that the results we obtain
are valid over all distributions of responsibility and compensation parameters,
since no explicit assumptions on these distributions are stated. We conclude
this section with some remarks.
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3.1 Assumptions on the distribution of aR and aS and on
the pre-tax income function
We consider the case where aR and aS are scalars instead of vectors with support
[aRmin, a
R
max] and [a
S
min, a
S
max] respectively and a
R
min 6= aRmax and aSmin 6= aSmax. All
distributions of characteristics that have these properties belong to Σ.
The pre-tax income function f is continuously diﬀerentiable to the required
degree and monotonic in its arguments aR and aS .
Furthermore, let
∂f
∂aR
≥ 0 (3)
and1
∂f
∂aS
≥ 0 (4)
So for all pre-tax income functions having properties (3) and (4), the
poorest have characteristics (aRmin, a
S
min), while the richest have characteristics
(aRmax, a
S
max).
Denote by z+ the class of income functions that satisfy (3), (4) and
∂2f
∂aR∂aS
≥ 0 (5)
Denote by z− the class of income functions that satisfy (3), (4) and2
∂2f
∂aR∂aS
≤ 0 (6)
The goal of this paper is to look for Lorenz dominance results for diﬀerent
non-welfaristic redistribution mechanisms over the following domains:
D+ : the set of all economies with a ∈ Σ and whose income function f
belongs to z+.
D− : the set of all economies with a ∈ Σ and whose income function f
belongs to z−.
1Assumptions (3) and (4) are a matter of measurement. If, for example, we only have
information on handicaps, assumption (4) can be satisfied by redefining the information in
terms of ’lack of ... (handicap)’.
2Remark that income functions that belong to both z+ and z− are additively separable
in aR and aS . In that case both the egalitarian equivalent mechanism and the conditionally
egalitarian mechanism reduce to ’the natural redistribution mechanism’, which assigns the
income due to an individual’s aR entirely to that agent and divides the total income due to
aS equally among all agents (Bossert, 1995). The choice of a reference skill level or reference
preferences becomes irrelevant.
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3.2 Two egalitarian equivalent mechanisms
First, the following lemma identifies the poorest and richest individuals under
any egalitarian equivalent mechanism:
Lemma 1 : For all economies with a ∈ Σ and f satisfying (3), under any egal-
itarian equivalent mechanism, the poorest individuals have responsibility charac-
teristic aRmin and the richest individuals have responsibility characteristics a
R
max,
irrespective of their compensation characteristics aS.
Proof. : Since an egalitarian equivalent mechanism exists of an individ-
ual specific part f(aRk , a˜
S) plus a uniform transfer, income is increasing in aR.
Income diﬀerences do not depend on diﬀerences in aS .
We state the following proposition:
Proposition 1 : For all economies in D+ (D−), an egalitarian equivalent
mechanism with reference compensation characteristic a˜S1 (a˜
S
2 ) Lorenz domi-
nates an egalitarian equivalent mechanism with reference compensation charac-
teristic a˜S2 (a˜
S
1 ) if and only if a˜
S
1 ≤ a˜S2 .
Proof. : Compare two egalitarian equivalent mechanisms with reference
compensation characteristics a˜S1 and a˜
S
2 (a˜
S
1 ≤ a˜S2 ; a˜S1 , a˜S2 ∈ [aSmin, aSmax]). Using
(1), the income diﬀerence for an individual k between the two mechanisms
equals:
Y
EE,a˜S1
k − Y
EE,a˜S2
k = f(a
R
k , a˜
S
1 )− f(aRk , a˜S2 ) +A = φ(aRk )
where A =
¡
1
n
Pn
i=1 f(a
R
i , a˜
S
2 )− 1n
Pn
i=1 f(a
R
i , a˜
S
1 )
¢
.
Redistribution in the first best means that:Pn
i=1 φ(a
R
i ) = 0. (∗)
By (4) and (a˜S1 ≤ a˜S2 ): A ≥ 0 and f(aRk , a˜S1 )− f(aRk , a˜S2 ) ≤ 0. (∗∗)
For D+:
by (5), φ(aRk ) is decreasing in a
R
k . (∗ ∗ ∗)
(∗), (∗∗) and (∗ ∗ ∗) make that ∃aR+(a˜S1 , a˜S2 ) ∈ R, aRmin < aR+ < aRmax:
aRk ≤ aR+ ⇒ φ(aRk ) ≥ 0 : these individuals receive at least the same income
under a˜S1 than under a˜
S
2 .
aRk ≥ aR+ ⇒ φ(aRk ) ≤ 0 : these individuals receive at most the same income
under a˜S1 than under a˜
S
2 .
So there are transfers of income from individuals with a high aR to indi-
viduals with a low aR. Since an egalitarian equivalent mechanism exists of an
individual specific part f(aRk , a˜
S) plus a uniform transfer, income is increas-
ing in aR. This implies that all transfers go from rich to poor. As a result
the income distribution of the egalitarian equivalent mechanism with reference
compensation characteristic a˜S1 Lorenz dominates the income distribution of the
egalitarian equivalent mechanism with reference compensation characteristic a˜S2 .
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For D−:
by (6), φ(aRk ) is increasing in a
R
k . (∗ ∗ ∗∗)
(∗), (∗∗) and (∗ ∗ ∗∗) make that ∃aR−(a˜S1 , a˜S2 ) ∈ R, aRmin < aR− < aRmax:
aRk ≤ aR− ⇒ φ(aRk ) ≤ 0 : these individuals receive at most the same income
under a˜S1 than under a˜
S
2 .
aRk ≥ aR− ⇒ φ(aRk ) ≥ 0 : these individuals receive at least the same income
under a˜S1 than under a˜
S
2 .
So there are transfers of income from individuals with a low aR to individ-
uals with a high aR, that is all transfers go from poor to rich. As a result
the income distribution of the egalitarian equivalent mechanism with reference
compensation characteristic a˜S2 Lorenz dominates the income distribution of the
egalitarian equivalent mechanism with reference compensation characteristic a˜S1 .
Note that proposition 1 is instructive for the choice of reference compensation
characteristic a˜S , since this choice determines the inequality in the resulting
income distribution.
3.3 Two conditionally egalitarian mechanisms
First, the following lemma identifies the poorest and richest individuals under
any conditionally egalitarian mechanism:
Lemma 2 : For all economies in D+, under any conditionally egalitarian
mechanism, the poorest individuals have characteristics (aRmin, a
S
max) and the
richest individuals have characteristics (aRmax, a
S
max). For all economies in
D−, under any conditionally egalitarian mechanism, the poorest individuals
have characteristics (aRmin, a
S
min) and the richest individuals have characteristics
(aRmax, a
S
min).
Proof. : For D+ or D−, employing (3),
∂Y CEk
∂aRk
= ∂f
∂aRk
≥ 0 (see (2)), so
the poorest have responsibility characteristic aRmin and the richest have respon-
sibility characteristic aRmax . For D
+, due to (5), for those individuals with
aRmin,
∂Y CEk
∂aSk
= ∂f
∂aSk
|aRmin −
∂f
∂aSk
|a˜R < 0, while for those individuals with aRmax,
∂Y CEk
∂aSk
= ∂f
∂aSk
|aRmax − ∂f∂aSk |a˜R > 0, implying that both the poorest and the richest
have compensation characteristics aSmax. For D
−, due to (6), for those individ-
uals with aRmin,
∂Y CEk
∂aSk
= ∂f
∂aSk
|aRmin −
∂f
∂aSk
|a˜R > 0, while for those individuals with
aRmax,
∂Y CEk
∂aSk
= ∂f
∂aSk
|aRmax − ∂f∂aSk |a˜R < 0, implying that both the poorest and the
richest have compensation characteristics aSmin.
From lemma 2 and lemma 1, note that for all economies in D+ or D− the
poorest and the richest under a conditionally egalitarian mechanism are also
among the poorest and richest under an egalitarian equivalent mechanism.
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We state the following proposition:
Proposition 2 : There is no Lorenz dominance between two diﬀerent condi-
tionally egalitarian mechanisms for all economies in D+ or D−.
Proof. : Compare two conditionally egalitarian mechanisms with reference
preferences a˜R1 and a˜
R
2 (a˜
R
1 ≤ a˜R2 ; a˜R1 , a˜R2 ∈ [aRmin, aRmax]). Using (2), the income
diﬀerence for an individual k between the two mechanisms equals:
Y
CE,a˜R1
k − Y
CE,a˜R2
k = f(a˜
R
2 , a
S
k )− f(a˜R1 , aSk ) +B = ϕ(aSk )
where B =
¡
1
n
Pn
i=1 f(a˜
R
1 , a
S
i )− 1n
Pn
i=1 f(a˜
R
2 , a
S
i )
¢
.
Redistribution in the first best means that:Pn
i=1 ϕ(a
S
i ) = 0. (∗)
By (3) and (a˜R1 ≤ a˜R2 ): B ≤ 0 and f(a˜R2 , aSk )− f(a˜R1 , aSk ) ≥ 0. (∗∗)
For D+:
by (5), ϕ(aSk ) is increasing in a
S
k . (∗ ∗ ∗)
(∗), (∗∗) and (∗ ∗ ∗) make that ∃aS+(a˜R1 , a˜R2 ) ∈ R, aSmin < aS+ < aSmax:
aSk ≤ aS+ ⇒ ϕ(aSk ) ≤ 0 : these individuals receive at most the same income
under a˜R1 than under a˜
R
2 .
aSk ≥ aS+ ⇒ ϕ(aSk ) ≥ 0 : these individuals receive at least the same income
under a˜R1 than under a˜
R
2 .
So there are transfers of income from individuals with a low aS to individuals
with a high aS . From lemma 2, the poorest and the richest individuals gain from
the transfers, making Lorenz dominance impossible.
For D−:
by (6), ϕ(aSk ) is decreasing in a
S
k . (∗ ∗ ∗∗)
(∗), (∗∗) and (∗ ∗ ∗∗) make that ∃aS−(a˜R1 , a˜R2 ) ∈ R, aSmin < aS− < aSmax:
aSk ≤ aS− ⇒ ϕ(aSk ) ≥ 0 : these individuals receive at least the same income
under a˜R1 than under a˜
R
2 .
aSk ≥ aS− ⇒ φ(aSk ) ≤ 0 : these individuals receive at most the same income
under a˜R1 than under a˜
R
2 .
So there are transfers of income from individuals with a high aS to individ-
uals with a low aS . From lemma 2, the poorest and the richest individuals gain
from the transfers, making Lorenz dominance impossible.
Remark that for all economies in D+ or D− the poorest gain income from
the change of a conditionally egalitarian mechanism with a higher a˜R to a con-
ditionally egalitarian mechanism with a lower a˜R. This suggest that results in
terms of poverty dominance might be drawn, but more assumptions on the pre-
tax income function are needed. We come back to this issue within our specific
framework in paragraph 4.2.
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3.4 EE versus CE
We state the following proposition:
Proposition 3 : Apart from one unique exception3, a conditionally egalitarian
mechanism does not Lorenz dominate an egalitarian equivalent mechanism for
all economies in D+ or D−.
Proof. : Compare an egalitarian equivalent mechanism with reference com-
pensation characteristic a˜S with a conditionally egalitarian mechanism with ref-
erence preferences a˜R (a˜S ∈ [aSmin, aSmax], a˜R ∈ [aRmin, aRmax]). Using (1) and (2),
the income diﬀerence between the two mechanisms for an individual k equals:
Y EE,a˜
S
k − Y
CE,a˜R
k = C +E = ψ(a
R
k , a
S
k )
where C = f(aRk , a˜
S) + f(a˜R, aSk )− f(aRk , aSk ) and E = 1n
Pn
i=1 f(a
R
i , a
S
i ) −
1
n
Pn
i=1 f(a
R
i , a˜
S)− 1n
Pn
i=1 f(a˜
R, aSi ).
Redistribution in the first best means that:Pn
i=1 ψ(a
R
i , a
S
i ) = 0.
E is the same for all individuals. Without further assumptions on the pre-tax
income function, E can be either positive or negative. Anyhow, the individu-
als that gain from the change of a conditionally egalitarian mechanism to an
egalitarian equivalent mechanism have a larger C than those who lose from the
regime change.
What happens with the income of the poorest and the richest under a con-
ditionally egalitarian mechanism after an egalitarian equivalent mechanism is
implemented? Divide the population in two groups: group 1 comprises all in-
dividuals with aSk ≤ a˜S , group 2 all individuals with aSk ≥ a˜S . From lemma 2,
both belong to group 2 for all economies in D+ and to group 1 for all economies
in D−.
For D+:
by (5), ∂C
∂aRk
=
∂f(aRk ,a˜
S)
∂aRk
− ∂f(a
R
k ,a
S
k )
∂aRk
≤ 0 for group 2.
∃a`R+(a˜R, a˜S , aSmax) ∈ R:
aRk ≤ a`R+ ⇒ ψ(aRk , aSmax) ≥ 0 : these individuals receive at least the same
income under EE than under CE.
aRk ≥ a`R+ ⇒ ψ(aRk , aSmax) ≤ 0 : these individuals receive at most the same
income under EE than under CE.
3For D+ (D−), this unique exception is the case when the EE-mechanisms has a˜S = aSmax
(aSmin) and the CE-mechanism has a˜
R chosen such that f(a˜R, a˜S) = E. In this specific
comparison, the income of the poorest and the richest remains unchanged under both mecha-
nisms. In order to derive Lorenz dominance results, further assumptions on the distributions
of responsibility and compensation characteristics have to be made. We illustrate this specific
exception in the numerical example in paragraph 4.3.
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For D−:
by (6), ∂C
∂aRk
=
∂f(aRk ,a˜
S)
∂aRk
− ∂f(a
R
k ,a
S
k )
∂aRk
≤ 0 for group 1.
∃a`R−(a˜R, a˜S , aSmin) ∈ R:
aRk ≤ a`R− ⇒ ψ(aRk , aSmin) ≥ 0 : these individuals receive at least the same
income under EE than under CE.
aRk ≥ a`R− ⇒ ψ(aRk , aSmin) ≤ 0 : these individuals receive at most the same
income under EE than under CE.
If respectively a`R+, a`
R
− ∈ [aRmin, aRmax], the poorest do not become poorer and
the richest do not become richer under EE than under CE. Therefore, the nec-
essary condition for Lorenz dominance of an egalitarian equivalent mechanism
over a conditionally egalitarian mechanism is fulfilled, implying that the neces-
sary condition for Lorenz dominance of a conditionally egalitarian mechanism
over an egalitarian equivalent mechanism is violated, proving the proposition.
However, this necessary condition cannot be assumed to hold generally without
further assumptions on the pre-tax income function. If a`R+, a`
R
− /∈ [aRmin, aRmax],
the incomes of the poorest and the richest change in the same direction mak-
ing Lorenz dominance results between egalitarian equivalent mechanisms and
conditionally egalitarian mechanisms impossible. We come back to this issue in
paragraph 4.3.
3.5 Remarks
Remark that the validity of propositions 1-3 only holds for all economies in
D+ or D−, in the case where the responsibility and compensation parameter
is one-dimensional. Extending these limiting assumptions greatly enlarges the
diﬃculty to obtain clear solutions.
Within the case where aR or aS are scalars, Lorenz dominance results are
hard to establish. Extensions to the case where aR and aS are vectors lead
to even fewer dominance results. Under multidimensional versions of (3), (4)
and (5) or (6), requiring that the derivatives of the pre-tax income function
with respect to every element in the aR- and aS-vectors are positive and the
cross derivatives have equal sign, an unambiguous comparison of two diﬀerent
egalitarian equivalent mechanisms along the lines of proposition 1 can only be
made when every element in the reference skill vector a˜S changes in the same
direction.
Restricting the analysis to income functions inz+ andz− drives the positive
result of proposition 1. A natural question is whether we can derive Lorenz dom-
inance results for the comparison of two conditionally egalitarian mechanisms
by restricting the analysis to other classes of income functions. Suppose that the
income function still satisfies (3) and (4) but ∂
2f
∂aR∂aS changes sign:
∂2f
∂aR∂aS ≤ 0
for small values of aR, ∂
2f
∂aR∂aS ≥ 0 for large values of a
R and ∂
3f
∂2aR∂aS ≥ 0. De-
note this class of income functions z±. The poorest gain income and the richest
lose income if the a˜R of the new conditionally egalitarian mechanism is lower
than a˜R of the old conditionally egalitarian mechanism. Indeed, the transfers
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going to the poorest increase as a˜R decreases, while the transfers going to the
richest decrease as a˜R decreases. However, this result only holds if, under both
mechanisms, the poorest have characteristics (aRmin, a
S
min) and the richest have
characteristics (aRmax, a
S
max). This does not apply for all income functions in z±,
making Lorenz dominance results only possible over suitably defined domains.
4 Distributional analysis: example
In this section, we illustrate our previous results with an example, based on
a framework adopted in Schokkaert et al. (2003), following Atkinson (1995).
Closed form solutions for the pre-tax income function and the diﬀerent non-
welfaristic redistribution schemes are derived. We show that the pre-tax income
function belongs to z+, which automatically enables us to draw a corollary
from proposition 1, since we assume that the distributional assumptions of do-
main D+ also hold true. Despite the fact that we look at one particular income
function and hence use very detailed information about it, we show that the
no-dominance results of proposition 2 and proposition 3 remain. However, this
example enables us to draw more precise results with respect to poverty dom-
inance between two conditionally egalitarian mechanisms. In particular, an
upper bound poverty line is determined below which poverty is unambiguously
reduced under one of the two regimes. Finally, the comparison of an egalitarian
equivalent mechanism with a conditionally egalitarian mechanism is revisited.
We show exactly which egalitarian equivalent mechanisms are eligible to Lorenz
dominate which conditionally egalitarian mechanisms in our example. Addi-
tionally, a small numerical example proofs the necessity of making assumptions
on the marginal distributions of individual characteristics.
4.1 Responsibility versus compensation
Suppose individuals diﬀer in only two dimensions. The first dimension is their
skill level w, assumed to be beyond their control as it is completely determined
by their genetic endowment. The second variable is a preference parameter e,
meant to capture a pure preference for leisure. Compensation is desirable for
diﬀerences in w, while at the same time individuals can be held responsible
for diﬀerences in e. We suppose that both variables have finite support: the
preference parameter and the skill level are measured such that 0 < eL ≤ e ≤ 1
and 0 < wL ≤ w ≤ 1 respectively, but we exclude the possibility that eL =
1 and wL = 1. For convenience
4, we assume that e and w are distributed
independently with density functions gw (w) : [wL, 1]→ R and ge (e) : [eL, 1]→
R. All distributions of characteristics that satisfy these properties belong to
Σ◦, which is equivalent to Σ with a continuum of individuals and the additional
assumption of independence.
4Furthermore, it is doubtful that agents should be held responsible for characteristics which
are determined by characteristics that require compensation.
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4.1.1 The pre-tax income function belongs to z+
In our first best setting, we rule out behavioural responses: every individual
chooses her labor supply as if there were no redistribution, or alternatively the
government has complete information on individual behaviour and is able to
enforce this behaviour.
Suppose labor supply is iso-elastic:
L = eεwε (7)
where ε is the constant elasticity of labor supply, a measure for the eﬃciency
cost of the tax and assumed to be identical for all individuals.
Using (7), pre-tax income f as a function of e and w equals:
f(e, w) = wL = eεwε+1 (8)
Pre-tax income is increasing in both e and w, implying that the laziest,
lowest skilled people (eL, wL) are poorest. The technical rate of substitution
∂w
∂e |f()=cte equals − ε(ε+1) we . Since ∂f(e,w)∂e , ∂f(e,w)∂w and ∂
2f(e,w)
∂e∂w are positive, the
pre-tax income function belongs to z+.
In this section, we search for Lorenz dominance results of diﬀerent non-
welfaristic redistribution mechanisms over the following domain:
D◦ : the set of all economies with gw (w), ge (e) ∈ Σ◦ and f(e, w) given by
(8).
4.1.2 The egalitarian equivalent mechanism
Define the α-th moment of a variable x with support [x, x] as:
µα (x) =
Z x
x
xαgx (x) dx (9)
Using (8) and (9), the egalitarian equivalent mechanism can be rewritten in
a continuous framework. An individual k receives an income:
Y EEk = f(ek, w˜)−
1Z
eL
1Z
wL
(f(e, w˜)− f(e, w)) ge(e)gw(w)dedw
= eεkw˜
ε+1 − µε(e)w˜ε+1 + µε(e)µε+1(w) (10)
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where w˜ denotes the reference skill level, chosen by the social planner5.
Y EE is increasing in e but Y EE is no longer a function of w. This implies
that the laziest (e = eL) are poorest and the hard working (e = 1) are richest,
regardless their skill level (cfr. lemma 1).
From proposition 1 we have:
Corollary 1 : For all economies in D◦, an egalitarian equivalent mechanism
with reference compensation characteristic w˜1 Lorenz dominates an egalitarian
equivalent mechanism with reference compensation characteristic w˜2 if and only
if w˜1 ≤ w˜2.
4.1.3 The conditionally egalitarian mechanism
Using (8) and (9), an individual k receives under a conditionally egalitarian
mechanism an income:
Y CEk = f(ek, wk)− f(e˜, wk) +
1Z
wL
f(e˜, w)gw(w)dw
= eεkw
ε+1
k − e˜
εwε+1k + e˜
εµε+1(w) (11)
where e˜ denotes the reference preference parameter, chosen by the social
planner6.
Y CE is increasing in e. Since e˜ ≥ eL, Y CE is no longer increasing in w
for all individuals. More precisely, the poorest are laziest (e = eL) and highest
skilled (w = 1), while the richest are hard working (e = 1) and highest skilled
(w = 1)(cfr. lemma 2). The technical rate of substitution ∂w
∂e |Y CE=cte equals
− ε(ε+1)w
eε−1
(eε−e˜ε) , which is larger than the TRS of the pre-tax income function
and is positive for all individuals i with ei < e˜. Figure 1 depicts iso-Y
CE
curves for a conditionally egalitarian mechanism with reference preference e˜
(Y CE1 < Y
CE
2 < Y
CE
3 ):
5Note that when w˜ = 0, Y EE is equally distributed. However, a non-welfaristic social
planner will not choose w˜ = 0, since this completely eliminates the impact of responsibility on
received income, which clearly contrasts the goal of non-welfaristic redistribution. Through-
out, we assume that w˜ is chosen between [wL, 1].
6We assume that e˜ is chosen between [eL, 1]. It deserves mentioning that in order to avoid
the delicate choice of w˜ or e˜, Fleurbaey (1995) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) also propose
average versions of the egalitarian equivalent mechanism and the conditionally egalitarian
mechanism (FAEE and FACE respectively). The idea is to use every value of w ∈ [wL, 1] or
e ∈ [eL, 1] successively as w˜ or e˜ and to give each agent the average of the resulting incomes she
would obtain under these diﬀerent FEE or FCE mechanisms. However, it can be easily shown
that in this example FAEE is equivalent to an FEE-mechanism with w˜ =
¡
µε+1(w)
¢ 1
ε+1 and
FACE is equivalent to a FCE-mechanism with e˜ = (µε(e))
1
ε .
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Figure 1 : Iso-Y CE curves for FCEe˜
Note that Y CE will never be equally distributed. Graphically, all individuals
would have to lie on the same iso-Y CE curve. This requires correlation between
e and w, which violates our independence assumption7.
Making an income distribution comparison between two conditionally egal-
itarian mechanisms FCEe˜1 and F
CE
e˜2
with diﬀerent reference preferences e˜1 and
e˜2 (e˜1 ≤ e˜2) leads to the following conclusion:
• For all economies in D◦, there is no Lorenz dominance between two con-
ditionally egalitarian mechanisms with reference preferences e˜1 and e˜2.
8
4.2 Poverty dominance between two conditionally egali-
tarian mechanisms
Denote Y CE, e˜(e, w) the income an individual with characteristics (e,w) receives un-
der a conditionally egalitarian mechanism FCEe˜ with reference preferences e˜. As
suggested at the end of paragraph 3.3, the fact that Y CE, e˜1(eL, 1) > Y
CE, e˜2
(eL, 1)
suggests
that we might arrive at a conclusion in terms of poverty dominance between
two diﬀerent conditionally egalitarian regimes. Specify Z as the poverty line:
people with an income below Z are considered poor. A function θ(Y |Z) mea-
sures the poverty of someone with income Y , conditional on the chosen poverty
line Z. Aggregate poverty under a certain regime F , given Z, can be written
7Remark that Y CE is equally distributed when ei = e˜ for all i. However, this distribution
/∈ Σ◦.
8Proof in Appendix
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in canonical form9 as P (F |Z) =
ZR
0
θ(Y |Z)gY (Y )dY . The following proposition
can be stated:
Proposition 4 : For all Z ≤ eεLµε+1(w), P (FCEe˜1 |Z) ≤ P (FCEe˜2 |Z) if e˜1 ≤ e˜2.
Proof. : The proof amounts to showing that FCEe˜1 Lorenz dominates F
CE
e˜2
over the income-interval [Y CE, e˜2(eL, 1) , Z]:
First, note that for all preferences within the interval [eL, e˜1], the technical
rate of substitution of the conditionally egalitarian regime with reference pref-
erences e˜1 is higher than the technical rate of substitution of the conditionally
egalitarian regime with reference preferences e˜2. Therefore, iso-income curves
satisfy the single crossing property over the subspace [eL, e˜1]× [wL, 1].
Second, remark that all individuals with characteristics (eL, (µε+1(w))
1
ε+1 )
receive an income Y CE∗ = e
ε
Lµε+1(w), irrespective of which conditionally egali-
tarian regime is implemented. The iso-Y CE∗ curve is depicted in figure 2 for two
conditionally egalitarian mechanisms FCEe˜1 and F
CE
e˜2
with reference preferences
e˜1 and e˜2 (eL < e˜1 < e˜2 < 1):
Figure 2: Iso-Y CE curves for FCEe˜1 and F
CE
e˜2
Third, it remains to show that two equal iso-Y CE curves of two diﬀerent
conditionally egalitarian regimes only cross when Y CE > Y CE∗ . These crossings
imply that assumptions about the marginal distributions of w and e have to be
made to establish poverty dominance for income levels larger than Y CE∗ : we need
to know exactly how many individuals are situated at each point in the e × w
9The class of poverty indices of the form P (F |Z) contains not only most widely-used indices
as the headcount ratio and the income gap ratio. More generally, it includes among others
all members of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke family as well as the Watts index. See Lambert
(2001) for an overview.
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space. Define we˜1
Y CE
(eL) as the skill level that an individual with preferences eL
should have to obtain an income Y CE under a conditionally egalitarian regime
with reference preferences e˜1. Keeping the single crossing property in mind, two
equal iso-Y CE curves of two diﬀerent conditionally egalitarian regimes cross over
the subspace [eL, e˜1]× [wL, 1] when:
we˜2
Y CE
(eL) > w
e˜1
Y CE
(eL)
⇔
¡
Y CE − e˜ε2µε+1(w)
¢ 1
1+ε
³
1
eεL−e˜ε2
´ 1
1+ε
>
¡
Y CE − e˜ε1µε+1(w)
¢ 1
1+ε
³
1
eεL−e˜ε1
´ 1
1+ε
(using (11))
⇔
¡
Y CE − e˜ε2µε+1(w)
¢
(eεL− e˜ε1) >
¡
Y CE − e˜ε1µε+1(w)
¢
(eεL− e˜ε2) since (eεL−
e˜ε1) < 0 and (e
ε
L − e˜ε2) < 0
⇔ (e˜ε2 − e˜ε1)Y CE > (e˜ε2 − e˜ε1)eεLµε+1(w)
⇔ Y CE > eεLµε+1(w) = Y CE∗ since (e˜ε2 − e˜ε1) > 0
which completes the proof10.
4.3 EE versus CE revisited
Let us reconsider the comparison of an egalitarian equivalent mechanism with
a conditionally egalitarian mechanism:
• For all economies in D◦, apart from one unique exception11, the income
distribution of a conditionally egalitarian mechanism cannot Lorenz dom-
inate the income distribution of any egalitarian equivalent mechanism12.
Finally, the remaining question is whether an egalitarian equivalent mech-
anism can Lorenz dominate a conditionally egalitarian mechanism. A priori,
one could think that the income distribution of the former Lorenz dominates
the income distribution of the latter, since the egalitarian equivalent mecha-
nism satisfies stronger compensation axioms and milder responsibility axioms
than the conditionally egalitarian mechanism. Therefore, we examine whether
all egalitarian equivalent mechanisms are eligible to Lorenz dominate all con-
ditionally egalitarian mechanisms. However, this assumption proves to be too
demanding, as summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 : For all economies in D◦, the income distribution of an egali-
tarian equivalent mechanism can only Lorenz dominate the income distribution
of all conditionally egalitarian mechanisms when w˜ ≤ (µε+1(w))
1
ε+1 .
10Analogously, it can be shown that equal iso-income curves of two diﬀerent conditionally
egalitarian regimes no longer cross for all income levels higher than the income of a person
with characteristics
³
1,
¡
µε+1(w)
¢ 1
ε+1
´
(see also figure 2).
11The unique exception is the comparison of an EE-mechanism with w˜ = 1 and a CE-
mechanism with e˜ = (µε(e))
1
ε . Under these two regimes the incomes of the poorest and
the richest do not change and Lorenz dominance is still possible. Further distributional
assumptions have to be made. We illustrate this exception in the numerical example at the
end of this paragraph.
12The proof is analogous to the proof of proposition 5 with reversed inequality signs.
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Proof. : Denote Y EE, w˜(e, w) the income an individual with characteristics (e, w)
receives under an egalitarian equivalent mechanism with reference skill level w˜.
The necessary condition for Lorenz dominance that the poorest have at least
the same income under FEE as under FCE, while the income of the richest
should not be higher under FEE than under FCE requires that: ∀e˜ :
Y CE, e˜(eL, 1) ≤ Y
EE, w˜
(eL, ·)
⇔ eεL − e˜ε + e˜εµε+1(w) ≤ eεLw˜ε+1 − µε(e)w˜ε+1 + µε(e)µε+1(w)
⇔ w˜ε+1 ≤ e˜
ε(µε+1(w)−1)+eεL−µε(e)µε+1(w)
(eεL−µε(e))
= RHS(1)
and
Y CE, e˜(1, 1) ≥ Y
EE, w˜
(1, ·)
⇔ 1− e˜ε + e˜εµε+1(w) ≥ w˜ε+1 − µε(e)w˜ε+1 + µε(e)µε+1(w)
⇔ w˜ε+1 ≤ e˜
ε(µε+1(w)−1)+1−µε(e)µε+1(w)
(1−µε(e))
= RHS(2)
Note that RHS(1) is increasing in e˜ since
(µε+1(w)−1)
(eεL−µε(e))
> 0 while RHS(2) is
decreasing in e˜ since
(µε+1(w)−1)
(1−µε(e))
< 0. The shaded pentagon of Figure 3 depicts
which values of w˜ and e˜ and corresponding FEE- and FCE-mechanisms fulfill
the necessary condition. Since the dominance result has to hold for all values of
e˜, only FEE-mechanisms with w˜ ≤ (µε+1(w))
1
ε+1 are eligible to Lorenz dominate
all FCE-mechanisms.
Figure 3: A necessary condition for LD
Now we know exactly which egalitarian equivalent mechanisms can Lorenz
dominate which conditionally egalitarian mechanisms. The question is whether
we can require the domain assumption that these Lorenz dominance results hold
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over all characteristics’ distributions in Σ◦, i.e. whether these dominance results
do not depend on specific assumptions about exactly how many individuals have
which characteristics. We proof this domain assumption is too demanding in
our example, as stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 : Lorenz dominance results of an egalitarian equivalent mech-
anism over a conditionally egalitarian mechanism cannot be drawn without as-
sumptions about the marginal distributions gw (w) and ge (e).
Proof. : Lorenz dominance of FEE,w˜ over FCE,e˜ amounts to second order
stochastic dominance of the cumulative income distribution function GEE,w˜(x),
over the cumulative income distribution functionGCE,e˜(x): S(Y ) =
R Y
Y CE,e˜min
(GCE,e˜(x)−
GEE,w˜(x))dx ≥ 0, for all Y ∈ [Y CE,e˜min , Y CE,e˜max ]13. From Figure 3 we see that all
egalitarian equivalent mechanisms can Lorenz dominate a conditionally egali-
tarian mechanism with e˜ = (µε(e))
1
ε . In the following simulation, whose set-up
is given in Appendix, we test whether Lorenz dominance is found when e and
w are uniformly distributed over the interval [0.1, 1] and ε = 1 for respectively
an egalitarian equivalent mechanism with w˜ = 0.5, w˜ = 0.7 and w˜ = 1 over a
conditionally egalitarian mechanism with e˜ = µ(e) = 0.55. The incomes of the
poorest and the richest under the four regimes equal:
Ymin Ymax
1) FCE,e˜=0.55 −0.2465 0.6535
2) FEE,w˜=0.5 0.091 0.316
3) FEE,w˜=0.7 −0.017 0.424
4) FEE,w˜=1 −0.2465 0.6535
Figure 4 depicts S(Y ), where 1) vs 2): upper curve, 1) vs 3): middle curve
and 1) vs 4): lower curve.
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
-0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6y
Figure 4: S(Y )
13Note that S(Y CE,e˜min ) = 0 and that S(Y
CE,e˜
max ) = µ
EE(Y )− µCE(Y ) = 0.
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Figure 4 shows that, when e and w are uniformly distributed, FEE,w˜=0.5
Lorenz dominates FCE,e˜=0.55. However, FEE,w˜=0.7 does not Lorenz dominate
FCE,e˜=0.55. Ultimately, FCE,e˜=0.55 Lorenz dominates FEE,w˜=1, which illus-
trates the unique combination of e˜ and w˜ for which the conditionally egalitarian
mechanism can Lorenz dominate the egalitarian equivalent mechanism14.
5 Conclusion
The implementation of a non-welfaristic redistribution mechanism not only re-
quires a normative judgement for the choice of reference responsibility or com-
pensation parameter. In order to trace out the implications of non-welfaristic
redistribution, also empirical information is needed. Only with accurate esti-
mations of the pre-tax income function and the distributions of responsibility
and compensation characteristics, diﬀerent non-welfaristic mechanisms can be
thoroughly compared. If one lacks such detailed information, but at least some
agreement on the properties of the pre-tax income function is reached, our anal-
ysis suggests that:
• Confronted with the choice which egalitarian equivalent mechanism to
implement and depending on the economy concerned, Lorenz dominance
and poverty dominance adherents choose either the egalitarian equivalent
mechanism with the lowest (if the economy belongs to D+) or with the
highest (if the economy belongs toD−) reference compensation parameter.
• Confronted with the choice which conditionally egalitarian mechanism to
implement, Lorenz dominance adherents do not favor any particular mech-
anism. Poverty dominance adherents choose the conditionally egalitarian
mechanism with the lowest reference responsibility parameter.
• If Lorenz dominance and poverty dominance adherents have the full choice
which non-welfaristic mechanism to implement, they should not believe
that any egalitarian equivalent mechanism Lorenz dominates all condition-
ally egalitarian mechanisms, since the former satisfies stronger compensa-
tion axioms and milder responsibility axioms than the latter. Depending
on the economy concerned, only egalitarian equivalent mechanisms with a
suﬃciently low (if the economy belongs to D+) or suﬃciently high (if the
economy belongs to D−) reference compensation parameter are eligible to
Lorenz dominate all conditionally egalitarian mechanisms.
14Indeed, note that the incomes of the poorest and the richest are unchanged under
FCE,e˜=0.55 and FEE,w˜=1.
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7 Appendix
• Proof of the income distribution comparison of section 4.1.2:
We show that both the poorest and the richest have at least the same income
under FCEe˜1 than under F
CE
e˜2
.
Indeed, Y CE, e˜1(eL, 1) ≥ Y
CE, e˜2
(eL, 1)
⇔ eεL − e˜ε1 + e˜ε1µε+1(w) ≥ eεL − e˜ε2 + e˜ε2µε+1(w)
⇔ (e˜ε2 − e˜ε1) ≥ (e˜ε2 − e˜ε1)µε+1(w)
which is the case since e˜2 ≥ e˜1 and 1 > µε+1(w).
Analogously, Y CE, e˜1(1, 1) ≥ Y
CE, e˜2
(1, 1)
⇔ 1− e˜ε1 + e˜ε1µε+1(w) ≥ 1− e˜ε2 + e˜ε2µε+1(w)
⇔ −e˜ε1(1− µε+1(w)) ≥ −e˜ε2(1− µε+1(w)) and since 1 > µε+1(w),
⇔ e˜ε1 ≤ e˜ε2
⇔ e˜1 ≤ e˜2
which is true by assumption.
• Numerical example set-up of section 4.3:
Take an arbitrary income level x ∈ [Y CE,e˜min , Y CE,e˜max ]:
1) GEE,w˜(x) :
GEE,w˜(x) = P (eεw˜ε+1 − µε(e)w˜ε+1 + µε(e)µε+1(w) ≤ x)
= P
µ
e ≤
³
x+µε(e)w˜
ε+1−µε(e)µε+1(w)
w˜ε+1
´ 1
ε
¶
=
µ
x+µε(e)w˜
ε+1−µε(e)µε+1(w)
w˜ε+1
¶ 1
εR
eL
ge(e)de
2) GCE,e˜(x) :
GCE,e˜(x) = P (eεwε+1 − e˜εwε+1 + e˜εµε+1(w) ≤ x)
i) ∀x ∈ [Y CE,e˜min , Y
CE,e˜
(e˜,·) = e˜
εµε+1(w)] :
22
= 1 −
Ã
1R
e2(x)
ge(e)de
!
−


e2(x)R
e1(x)
µ
x−e˜εµε+1(w)
eε−e˜ε
¶ 1
ε+1R
wL
gw(w)ge(e)dwde

 where
e1(x) = max{eL,
³
x−e˜εµε+1(w)+e˜εw
ε+1
L
wε+1L
´ 1
ε } and e2(x) = ¡x− e˜εµε+1(w) + e˜ε¢ 1ε
and g(e, w) = gw(w)ge(e) since w and e are independently distributed.
ii) ∀x ∈ [Y CE,e˜(e˜,·) , Y CE,e˜max ] :
=
Ã
e2(x)R
eL
ge(e)de
!
+


e3(x)R
e2(x)
µ
x−e˜εµε+1(w)
eε−e˜ε
¶ 1
ε+1R
wL
gw(w)ge(e)dwde

where e
3(x) =
min{
³
x−e˜εµε+1(w)+e˜εw
ε+1
L
wε+1L
´ 1
ε
, 1}
If we suppose that e ∼ U [eL, 1], w ∼ U [wL, 1] and ε = 1:
ge(e) =
1
1−eL , gw(w) =
1
1−wL , µ1(e) = µ(e) =
1+eL
2 and µ2(w) =
(w2L+wL+1)
3
S(Y ) =
R Y
Y CE,e˜min
(GCE,e˜(x)−GEE,w˜(x))dx then becomes a function of Y , eL,
wL, e˜ and w˜ and is simulated for eL = 0.1, wL = 0.1, e˜ = µ(e) = 0.55 and
w˜ = 0.5/0.7/1.
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